More on the Gay Marriage Ruling

Thanks to Cathy Grossman at USAToday for working her way through the court decision on gay marriage in California and pulling out the parts that are most relevant to the religious conversation.

Grossman notes that Judge Vaughn Walker’s decision at one point spells out in all CAPs what is the essential rationale for his decision. He writes, “A PRIVATE MORAL VIEW THAT SAME-SEX COUPLES ARE INFERIOR TO OPPOSITE-SEX COUPLES IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR LEGISLATION.” Judge Walker is absolutely correct. No “private” moral view should be the basis of any legislation, on same-sex couples or otherwise. But, there is nothing “private” about Catholic moral views.

Conservatives like to blame Griswold v. Connecticut, the landmark 1964 case in which the Supreme Court overturned a law that banned the sale and distribution of birth control, for our judiciary’s fixation with privacy rights. Alas, the problem is more ancient. The coarse maxim of the early Common Law – “A man’s home is his castle” – gives voice to a primitive notion of privacy. But, it was the Reformation that began the process by which Western thought came to the conclusion that morality was a matter of conscience only, not the outcome of consciences wrestling with the realities of the world outside of the conscience, all undertaken together as part of the one, universal Church. Edward Reed’s classic book “From Soul to Mind” shows how moral theology was transformed into modern psychology beginning with Erasmus Darwin and finishing with William James. I am not blaming the Common Law, Martin Luther or William James for Judge Walker’s ruling. I am saying that American culture has become complicit with the idea that morality is a private matter for some time. In this sense, the Church lost the battle over gay marriage a long time ago. We Catholics believe that morality is something discerned, not created, and it is difficult to see how we can make that insight felt in our nation’s jurisprudence.

This focus on privacy, however, seems especially misplaced when re-writing the rules of the road for civil marriage laws. After all, marriage is all about public recognition of a relationship, yes? That relationship is rooted in the privacy of the human heart, a fact recognized by the maxim of the law, again very ancient, that forbids testimony in court by spouses against each other. But, you don’t need a marriage contract if you are only interested in a private relationship. You get married to gain public recognition, and legal sanction, of the relationship.

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I understood why the majority of the Court ruled in Lawrence v. Texas that privacy concerns demanded that they overturn a sodomy law. That ruling was but a small step from a man’s home is his castle logic. But, I never understood Justice Scalia’s concern, voiced in his dissent, that the Lawrence ruling would expedite gay marriage and I still think there is a kind of cart/horse aspect to this. Yes, societal attitudes were changing, but the phenomenon under review – sexual conduct in the privacy of one’s own home versus a government-issued, very public, marriage license – are so different I could not imagine that Lawrence would beget yesterday’s ruling. Only a profound sense of confusion explains such a link.

That confusion is what Pope Benedict XVI calls the “dictatorship of relativism.” My problem with the Pope’s phrase is that it implies a thought-through agenda that I do not perceive in the cacophony of modern social trends. I prefer the phrase that Cardinal O’Connor used to employ, the “seraglio of the Enlightenment.” Judge Walker’s ruling seems to me an invitation to chaos, not to justice. Whatever your thoughts on gay marriage, this line of reasoning is disturbing, seeming to suggest no societal capacity to establish public norms for conduct. That, more than the result in this particular case, is the problem and it is a very big problem.

If people act like they are

If people act like they are married, are they married? Natural law would indicate, yes they are as the bond that develops between the parties is firm and life long lasting (hopefully).

The Church says you sin if first you don't let one of her appointed witnesses witness the recognition of the bond -- this might have more to do with stipends than with the sacramentality of the bond which exists when the bond is formed. Or this might be the Church's response to that fact that the nation states were influencing formation of households by requiring civil marriage licenses.

In any case, is civil 'marriage' an issue of natural law, or is the formation of households the primary reason that civil marriage is important? If it is about households then is makes sense that the civil government require a license. If 'marriage' is about that bond which the Church is convinced can be formed only between one man and one woman, then the Sacrament of Marriage can be witnessed by the Church with impunity when it exists between one man and one women. In as much as the Sacrament of Marriage imputes an household formation, it benefits the state to require a civil marriage license.

In the end it should be of little consequence to any church that any civil government issues any license as long as it maintains good order sufficient for any church to exist and function in that society maintained by civil government.

There is a side benefit to the Church's (which is in union with the Archbishop of Rome) defense of marriage between one woman and one man in natural law. It has become clear that telling married Catholics that they sin unless their marriage is formally witnessed by an appointee of the Church is on the whole unnecessary. The bond of marriage exists per natural law which is of divine origin, not in the Church's institutional recognition.

Mr. Winters-- I have to

Mr. Winters--
I have to admit, this post makes little sense to me. You seem to pick up one word (private) in a 130-odd page document that frightens you and use it to reinforce the canard of a "dictatorship of relativism." Perhaps this is due to the article that you read. I cannot say that I've read the article, as I was too busy reading the opinion.

First of all, the phrase which is, as you say, in all caps is such because it is a section heading. That being said, it is the thrust of his argument, though is also sadly inaccurate as a heading. The opinion does not say that moral disapprobation is not a legitimate grounds for legal prohibition, provided that that disapprobation has a REASONABLE basis. Moral disapproval IN AND OF ITSELF is inadequate. Rather than some "dictatorship of relativism" this case is rather a perfect example of the opposite: a free exchange of views and ideas based on reason to achieve the legal good. This strikes me as discernment at its finest. Its redolent on every page, as the "reasonable" arguments that supposedly underpin Prop 8 supporters moral disapprobation are analyzed and (utterly) demolished.

Which to you is more relativistic? This process, where arguments are made, engaged, and judged on their merits to find one side is lacking? Or to do the same, and then decide with those who made no good arguments simply because "it's what people want to hear?" You claim that we Catholics discern morality whereas others (we are left to infer) create it. As naive as that statement is on its face, it is also false in this context. First off, this is a case deciding not morality, but law. Secondly, I would be quite curious what process you would have that is more based on discernment of reality and comparative harms and goods than this one. Nothing was "created" that was not based on a solid and reasonable discernment and analysis of actual evidence. You may, of course, disagree with it. But hopefully you would have some reasonable arguments that could convince someone who didn't already agree with you, something the proponents of Prop 8 spectacularly failed to do.

You also seem to infer, as you do whenever you discuss this topic, that pro-gay marriage supporters simply affirmed this as a private matter. Again, had you actually read the decision, you would be hard-pressed to make this case (as you would be if you read a great many theological works on gay marriage that have nothing to do with "private, autonomous choice," by the way). The public nature and recognition of marriage had EVERYTHING to do with the reasoning of both the plaintiff couples and the reasoning of the court, from the social goods for the couple and children to that of state economies. To pretend that this is some insidious instance of relativism or individualism run amok simply belies the evidence. But of course, to discern that, one may have to dig a bit deeper than USA Today will allow.

What you fail to fully grasp,

What you fail to fully grasp, however, Mr. Winters, is that in Judge Walker's ruling you are staring liberalism square in the face. And liberalism is fully-entrenched in today's Democratic Party, eating and eroding away at it. So in essence the face you see staring at you in the opinion is that of the Democratic Party as well. It is only a matter of time until Pres. Obama reverses course on his opposition to same-sex marriage, as is current opinion is merely politically expedient, and more importantly because he is a full-throated supporter of the jurisprudential commitments that resulted in Judge Walker's ruling. And that is not an "attack" or some other thing on the President; it is clear in his teaching and in his writings that, while he may disagree with the outcome, he is fully in agreement with the reasoning.

Actually, leaving your

Actually, leaving your neighbors alone is a fairly conservative sentiment. Ted Olson is no raging liberal - and neither is Justice Kennedy, whose decision in Roemer v. Evans formed the basis for this case.

If in fact this were only a

If in fact this were only a private matter, that is one thing. But the public aspects of denying same-sex couples many of the same civil rights that heterosexual couples have makes it a public issue.

An example: In order to refinance their house in California, my daughter and her partner had to pay an attorney to have the partner's name taken off of the deed. Then they had to pay for the refinance. After that was completed, they again had to pay an attorney to replace the partner's name on the deed. My heterosexual daughter and her husband got their house refinanced promptly, with no extra money involved.

One small example of this being a matter of civil rights -- and that is a public issue.

Scalia recognized that

Scalia recognized that Lawrence would be the gateway to gay marriage and other such changes because it fundamentally altered the focus of Due Process and Equal Protection and analysis.

It used to be that a court deciding a Due Process case evaluated whether the state action impinged on a "fundamental" liberty interest. If it did, the state needed to show compelling reasons for its action. Traditionally, in order to determine whether a right was "fundamental" or not, the court would ask whether it was (1) deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition; and (2) implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

In a prior case (Bowers v Hardwick), the Supreme Court already evaluated whether sodomy was behavior that was "deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and resoundingly decided it was not.

In Lawrence, however, the court revisited the question and, in order to get around the precedent of Bowers, conducted the analysis at an entirely different level. Instead of asking whether the freedom to engage in sodomy was deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition--which, of course, it isn't--they ignored the specific conduct at issue and turned the case into a privacy case by framing the question as whether the state could restrict "private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home."

Using that broadened analysis, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers and concluded that the state's restrictions against sodomy did not withstand scrutiny. The Court reasoned:

"This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts
by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship
or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person
or abuse of an institution the law protects. It suffices for
us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon
this relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free
persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice."

Thus, it was the freedom to engage in private, sexual conduct within the home was within the sphere of personal and private interests that triggered the heightened scrutiny of a fundamental right.

Scalia also was concerned because Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion suggested a shift in its Equal Protection analysis. The anti-sodomy law in Lawrence applied on its face to heterosexuals and homosexuals. Men and women, heterosexual and homosexuals alike, all were subject to its prohibition of deviant sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex. However, the law clearly distinguished between the sexes in that men could violate the law only with other men and women only with other women.

Scalia suggested that such a distinction could not be the basis for objection since it is precisely the same distinction regarding partners that is drawn in state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. In other words, while it did not on its face distinguish between sexes, under Justice O'Connor's analysis the discrimination would creep in at the level of the sexual proclivity of the partner; that is, at the level of the conduct. She suggested that a law casting moral opprobrium on one class of people based on their proclivity for a certain type of conduct would trigger a "more searching form of rational basis review."

O'Connor's approach represented an entirely new sort of Equal Protection review. Scalia recognized that this approach would leave laws limiting marriage to heterosexual couples on "pretty shaky ground." After all, on their face they don't discriminate (any woman can marry any man, and vice versa), they would be subject to heightened scrutiny due to the moral judgment that they cast on one set of people.

That's precisely what Judge Walker concluded: Even though it is facially non-discriminatory, Proposition 8 violates Equal Protection because it targets gays an lesbians based on their relationship together, specifically due to sex.

Scalia was right on the money. We'll see whose view prevails when the Prop 8 case gets to the Supreme Court.

If Scalia argues honestly, he

If Scalia argues honestly, he will have to concede the point he made in his dissent and vote with the majority to affirm the District Court. His own dissent has certainly put him in a box and unless this case is used to overturn Lawrence v. Texas, I have doubt it will even be heard. If in the interim, other District courts and more importantly the federal circuits all affirm the District Court decision, SCOTUS will take a pass and by doing so nationalize the ruling.

Mr. Buechel: you really

Mr. Buechel:

you really failed to understand the point. Judge Walker reduced to a private moral disapproval what is a public, objective assessment of value: that society has an interest in men and women getting together to bear and raise children, whereas it has no interest whatsoever in people's romantic/sexual pairings (either homosexual or heterosexual).

No, he found that there was

No, he found that there was no state interest in the first place, because heterosexual marriages can be validly contracted without the requirement of fecundity. Not even the Catholic Church insists on fecundity - only functionality. If this were not the case, people could not marry after the woman was past menopause in either Church nor state.

It was only after this finding that he could continue to his conclusion.

Moral disapproval was the wrong word to use. Animus or moral scorn would have caused less trouble and have the equal effect. Moral animus was used in Roemer v. Evans to strike down a constitutional amendment prohibiting gay rights legilsation. The defendents campaign materials were subjected to close analysis and it was found that animus was indeed the reason for the Proposition. Of course, animus is never moral and neither was Prop 8.

Be glad that the common law

Be glad that the common law and the consitution allows the privacy out as well as the freedom of relgions to do what they want. You would not like the alternative - for a state that is empowered to rule on the wrongness of homosexuality would also be able to rule on its rightness and impose that ruling on the Churches.

By the way, the Church's teaching on this issue is not consistent with any natural law reasoning that does not seek refuge in scripture and theism. That's not my view, its the view of the author of Fagothy's Right and Reason, which is the ethics book used in Catholic minor seminary.

The teaching that homosexuality is disordered is a band-aid. Prior to that teaching, which is recent, the church was on the road to teaching that homosexuals were wonderfully made and that sexuality is a gift from God. Put the two together, and you have to concede gay marriage and the licitness of homosexual sexuality. JPII, assisted by the current Pope, attempted retrenchment - but it won't last.

Traditionally, Catholic teaching on marriage has followed the lead of the state and in some nations, marriage and its sacramental blessing are still separate acts. This presents a problem for the Church, which can be solved in understanding Torah teaching on what happens in marriage, which Christ echoed when addressing the question of divorce. When someone gets married, the leave their families and cling to their spouse and the two shall become one. That is as much about legality as sexuality and it is true regardless of the genders of the parties involved. What was disturbing was the parents of gay children excluding their life partners in times of medical crisis and the state not recognizing their rights in relation to the rights of the family. This had to be corrected and marriage corrects it. Celebrating weddings in the Catholic Church is a way for families to recognize that the familial dynamic has altered. To not celebrate gay weddings is to deny Catholic families with gay members the chance to come to grips with the transition, which comes when one person promises fidelity to another - which is the essence of sacramental marriage and does not depend upon either priest nor witness (as I was taught in both marriage prep and Catholic H.S.).

On the question of moral disapproval, it could have easily been written as moral scorn - meaning that moral scorn is no more an actionable right under the freedom of religion (demanding conformity by society, such as outlawing the marriage rights of others or their right to serve in the armed forces) than yelling fire in a theater is a legitimate application of the freedom of speech. This protects the Church in areas in the south where the prominent domination still holds to and teaches the belief that the Pope is the anti-Christ. You cannot have it both ways.

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